This paper uncovers and quantifies Israel's exports to countries that ban trade with Israel. Israel exported a total of $6.4 billion worth of merchandise to boycott countries between 1962 and 2012, and most of this trade is illicit, i.e. not recorded by the importers. We find that electronic exports to Malaysia account for the lion's share of this trade but it also includes a wide array of products from footwear to fruit and vegetables. Our estimates suggest Israel's exports to these countries would be 10 times larger without the boycott. On top of providing further evidence on the unintended consequences of unilateral trade bans, this paper provides a case study on the role of politics in international trade.
INTRODUCTION
Economists have recently paid much attention to the role of politics in international trade.
Umana Dajud (2013) showed that political distance, i.e. the correlation between countries' voting behavior at the United Nations' General Assembly, has a negative impact on bilateral trade; Michaels and Zhi (2010) showed that when France and the US disagreed over war in Iraq at the UN, their bilateral trade fell; Fuchs and Klann (2013) showed that countries officially receiving the Dalai Lama at the highest political level see their exports to China fall; and Fisman et al. (2014) that the stock prices of Japanese companies with high China exposure suffer when Sino-Japanese relations suddenly deteriorate, as during the Senkaku Island dispute. Heilmann (2016) showed that consumer boycotts resulting from political 1 The boycott prohibits citizens from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. It is not limited
1 The Arab League Boycott can be traced back to the Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine when Arab leaders sought to ban products of Jewish industry in Palestine to deter Jewish immigration to the region. The first formal declaration of boycott was issued in 1945. It stated that "Products of Palestinian Jews are to be considered undesirable in Arab countries. They should be prohibited and refused as long as their production in Palestine might lead to the realization of Zionist political aim" (Losman, 1972) .
to Arab League since four Latin-American countries have cut trade ties with Israel due to governments' political leaning or after conflicts such as the June 2010 Gaza flotilla raid.
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In theory, the boycott should make trade between Israel and boycott countries nonexistent.
Unlike the consumer boycotts examined by Heilmann (2016) , the Arab League Boycott is an official government policy. According to Adelman (2008) (2009)), and it's also possible to find traces of illicit trade in stock-market reactions to news (DellaVigna and Ferrara, 2010) . Our paper follows this line of work to uncover and quantify exports from Israel to boycott countries. In doing so it also provides a case study to complement our understanding of the role of politics and foreign policy in international trade.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the data and present descriptive statistics on the boycott-avoiding trade. In Section 3 we discuss estimates of the effect of the boycott on Israel exports and Section 4 concludes. can be found in footnote 3.
A first look at the data suggests that Israel does report exports to boycott countries.
Israel exports statistics suggest $6.4 billion of exports have gone to boycott countries between 1962 and 2012. That represents around 0.74% of total Israel exports. Figure 1 and Table   1 provide the country and product distribution of these exports, while Figure Gat (Atkins, 2014) . Figure 1 and Table 1 suggests that these exports to Malaysia account for most of this gap. Yet, Israel exports also include a wide array of products from plastics to fruit and vegetables.
A second look at the data suggests that many boycott countries do not report most of this trade, giving rise to a large trade gap. Yet, as shown in Figure 1 , not all trade goes unreported at import customs, suggesting that the boycott has not been enforced constantly over the years. When we look at the evolution of the trade gap, i.e. the log difference between reported Israel exports and reported imports, the usual measure of missing trade in the literature (Fisman and Wei, 2004) find it no lower on average in boycott countries than in non-boycott countries ( Figure 5 ), 6 We also looked for traces of fake certificates of origin, from Cyprus, Lebanon or Turkey in industry level data but found no such evidence. This type of practice may be hard to detect as often the volume of imports from such third countries drowns Israel export reports. For example Oman's imports from Lebanon are worth 100 times more than Israel's export to Oman, or Saudi Arabia imports from Turkey are 2000 times larger than Israel's exports to Saudi Arabia.
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suggesting that international supply chains may make boycotts ineffective.
BOYCOTT EFFECTS ON ISRAEL EXPORTS
The descriptive evidence above suggests there is indeed substantial exports from Israel to boycott countries. In order to estimate how larger Israel export flows would be absent the boycott we plot Israel exports against destination GDPs in Figure 6 . To estimate by how much policy changes within a country affect Israel exports we estimate the following equation:
where where α i and σ t are importer and year fixed effects, EX it are exports from Israel to country i in year t, Boycott it is a dummy equal to one if the country-year bans trade with Israel, and Controls it are control variables, namely the logs of GDP and GDP per capita.
The coefficient on Boycott it , β 1 , gives us the effect of the boycott on Israel exports. To include as many country-years with unreported trade as possible, we replaced missing values with zeros, but only for country-years that did report imports from any country. (As some country-years do not report imports at all and we cannot be sure these are cases of zero imports from Israel.) We then added $1 before taking logs (adding $1,000 or taking the inverse hyperbolic sine instead does not alter the results (not shown)).
Results are in columns 1-3 of Table 3 . The coefficient on Boycott it is estimated around -2.4, which suggests that cutting ties decreased exports by 90% on average during 1962-2012.
To check whether changes in policy lead to illicit, or boycott-avoiding, exports, we estimate the same equation but replacing exports on the left-hand side with a dummy indicating Israeli missing exports. More precisely, "Israeli missing exports" is a dummy equal to 1 if imports from Israel=0 and Israel exports>0, and equal to zero otherwise. In the case of Oman for example, the dummy switched from zero to 1 in 2001. Results in columns 4-6 suggest that the probability of observing "Israeli missing exports" increases by around 20 percentage points when countries break ties with Israel. This is a large increase as the average probability is 18% over the whole sample. It is thus more than doubled when countries break ties. If we focus just on boycott countries, over the whole period the average probability of observing "Israeli missing exports" is 65% on average and 77% during boycott years.
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As a robustness check we replace Israel exports and missing exports on the left-hand side with equivalent measures of US exports (Table 4 ). The idea is to check whether countries that boycott Israel, who might also be anti-American, might fail to report imports from the US as well, despite no formal ban. The US can thus be seen as a counterfactual, i.e. what would happen if there were no formal ban but still an anti-Israel sentiment. If we find an effect, it would suggest that the coefficient picks up anti-US and anti-Israel sentiment rather than the effect of a formal boycott. The lack of significant effects of the boycott on US exports and US Missing exports confirms that our results are driven by the boycott policies.
CONCLUSION
The aim of our paper was to investigate Israel's trade with boycott countries. As in previous studies, we find that an asymmetric trade policy gives rise to illicit trade that is observable in official trade statistics. The data suggest that Israel exported a total of $6.4 billion worth of merchandise to boycott countries between 1962 and 2012, and most of it is missing from importers' reports. We find that electronic exports to Malaysia account for the lion's share of this trade yet it also includes a wide array of products from footwear to fruit and vegetables.
We also show that the boycott is ineffective when it comes to blocking the import of Israeli value-added embedded in other countries' exports. While our results suggest there are ways to circumvent the boycott, economic forces are far from trumping politics. Israel' exports to boycott countries would be 10 times larger without the boycott. 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 Israel exports
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Note: Exports are as reported by Israel and imports are as reported by importing countries, both in UN Comtrade. Counterfactual exports are predicted by destination GDP (see Figure 6 for the 2012 case).
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